Are Judges Really More Principled than
Voters?
By RODERICK M.

HILLS, JR.*

CHRIS EISGRUBER'S ConstitutionalSelf-Government I articulately lays
out a familiar, respectable, and (I argue) misguided argument for giving federal judges broad discretion to read what they take to be our
moral convictions into the United States Constitution. The argument
relies heavily on Ronald Dworkin's famous case for a "moral" reading
of the United States Constitution. 2 However, Dworkin's argument is
the lineal descendant of a much older and more explicitly anti-democratic theory that was less concerned with judicial review and more
concerned with social classes. According to this older theory, only a
landed aristocracy could truly represent the permanent interests of
the nation, because only this social class was sufficiently independent
of economic need to be impartial about moral principles. Persons
without land would be driven by their immediate appetites to sell their
allegiance to the highest bidder without regard to the long-term interest of the nation. Therefore, it was in the interest of the nation, including commoners, to give the landed gentry special power to govern
the nation, usually by special representation in a legislative assembly.
Eisgruber and Dworkin have substituted the life tenure and unchanging salary of Article III judges for the real property of the
landed gentry, but, mutatis mutandi, the logic of their argument is the
same as the old Tory case for the House of Lords. Article III courts are
"forumns of principle," because the Constitution guarantees that they
enjoy "social prestige and a comfortable salary" regardless of their decisions. 3 Thus, judges, like the landed gentry, do not stand to gain or
lose any material benefit from their exercise of power: They can deliberate freely about the meaning of moral principle "on the basis of the
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right kind of reasons."'4 Voters, by contrast, can reap economic benefits from their political power; they can be expected, therefore, to ignore arguments rooted in principle in favor of self-serving arguments
that favor their short-term material self-interest. In their more clearsighted moments, voters can see their own shortcomings as deliberative political actors, so they approve constitutions turning over responsibility for serious moral deliberation to life-tenured judges, leaving
the political hustings for grubby pork barrel spending and eat and
swill campaigning. The judges represent the long-term interests of the
voters because they act from principle rather than from interest,
which is what the voters themselves want (at least during those rare
constitutional moments when they can muster up enough virtue to
think about moral principles). The resemblance of this argument to
the Tory argument for privileging the gentry is fairly straightforward:
It is not for nothing that English judges are still known as "barons"
and "law lords" and wear ermine, for these sumptuary indicia are fit
trappings of independence that Eisgruber and Dworkin favor-more
so, perhaps, than the priestly cassocks favored by their American
brethren.
I draw the analogy between the Dworkinian argument set forth by
Eisgruber and the older Tory argument not to mock the former but to
link the case against Eisgruber and Dworkin to an older political theory about the nature of impartial self-government. As I hope my discussion will indicate, Eisgruber's and Dworkin's argument rests on two
misunderstandings-one about the nature of "impartiality" and the
other about the nature of "self-government."
Briefly, Eisgruber assumes that the primary threat to impartiality
is material self-interest, to which mass publics are distinctively prone
to succumb. But this understanding of impartiality is too crude: partial
attachment can arise from the presence or absence of passion or ideology just as easily as the presence of material self-interest, and judges
as a class are as prone to these partialities as voters. Second, Eisgruber
assumes that "self-government" occurs whenever officials act on the
beliefs and values of the people they govern. But self-government requires more than this: it requires that the People be active agents in
causing their officials to respect their beliefs and values. Eisgruber's
judges do not respect the People's agency and, therefore, cannot respect their right of self-government, even if they were faithful repre-
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sentatives of the People's values-which, because of their class-based
partialities, they are not likely to be.
I.

What Does It Mean to Be "Impartial?"

Are life-tenured judges more impartial than voters and their
elected representatives? Eisgruber says that they are, for two distinct
reasons. First Eisgruber notes that judges' life tenure gives them the
assurance of "social prestige and a comfortable salary" regardless of
how anyone is affected by their decisions. 5 Freed from constituent
pressure to deliver the bacon, this ensures that 'judges will likely decide on the basis of a principled judgment-a judgment, in other
words, about what is good from a moral perspective, rather than a
'6
judgment about what is good for their careers or their pocketbooks.
Voters, by contrast, can improve their financial position through their
votes and therefore cannot be trusted to deliberate impartially about
moral principles. 7 Second, Eisgruber notes that 'judges must account
for their votes and their reasons," giving them "greater incentive to
reflect on the distinction between moral principle and self-interest." 8
According to Eisgruber, "[w]hat life tenure makes possible, public
scrutiny makes obligatory. Through lawjournals, newspapers, political
committees, and professional associations, Americans watch judges
carefully to make sure that their decisions are untainted by personal
interest."' By contrast, voters vote secretly, do not give reasons for
their votes, and know that their own individual vote is unlikely to influence the outcome of an election-all of which combine to make it
unlikely that "voters will take responsibility for their choices."10
A.

Some Problems with Eisgruber's Account of "Impartiality"

This short summary immediately indicates some trouble in Eisgruber's account of impartial deliberation. First, there is confusion
about whether impartiality is endangered or protected by external
pressure. On one hand, pressure from outside sources compromises
impartial deliberation: The judge must have the protections of a tenured professor to engage in truly impartial analysis of principle. On
the other hand, outside pressure from bar associations and journalists
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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ensures judicial impartiality, by purging the judge's decisions of "personal interest." Why the difference? Eisgruber does not say, an omission that gives his account of impartiality an ipse dixit quality. There is
also some tension in the reasons Eisgruber offers for distrusting the
impartiality of voters. On one hand, Eisgruber faults voters because
they are too attentive to the consequences of their votes: They vote as
rational self-maximizers, cannily trying to win financial benefits at the
ballot box. 1 I On the other hand, Eisgruber faults voters because they
are too careless about their votes: Each voter knows that "his or her
individual ballot is unlikely to affect the outcome of the election,"1 2 so
that they vote carelessly, without attention to the moral consequences
of their decision. But, of course, both of these claims cannot be true.
Knowing that their ballot could not affect the outcome, self-interested
voters would be rationally ignorant about politics and not vote at all.
That voters actually do vote in large numbers, despite the incentives
for rational ignorance of politics, suggests that something beyond selfinterest motivates their decision to do so. Maybe they vote as frivolously as Eisgruber suggests, but this frivolity has nothing to do with
13
seeking "what is good for their careers or their pocketbooks."'
Both of these difficulties boil down to a single problem: Eisgruber
over-simplifies impartiality by reducing it to freedom from the incentive of material self-interest. Eisgruber's own account, however, suggests that mere freedom from such material temptations cannot
guarantee impartiality: One is impartial only when one is both free
from the wrong sort of pressure and subject to the right sort of pressure. But what counts as proper and improper pressure? Eisgruber
does not say.
B.

What Does It Mean To Be "Impartial"-OfInterest, Passion,
and Principle?

Eighteenth century social theory had a richer vocabulary with
which to describe political motivation. Consider the tripartite division
of interest, passion, and principle. Persons are motivated by "interest"
when their goal is improvement of their own material well-being. For
instance, the White businessman who urges racist laws to exclude
Black competition is motivated by interest in this sense. Persons are
motivated by "passion" (or "affection") when they have an emotional
desire for a particular outcome. For example, the White racist
11.
12.
13.
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homebuyer who feels an emotional revulsion at living near a Black
neighbor is acting from a passion that may cause the racist to suffer an
economic loss (as his market choices will be constrained by his racist
emotions). Finally, persons act on "principle" when they support a position because it follows from some more general system of beliefs and
values compliance with which is regarded as intrinsically choice-worthy even if it is emotionally unappealing and materially unremunerative. The pacifist who refuses to use violence even in favor of causes or
persons whom he loves, undergoing emotional agony as a result, acts
from principle in this sense.
Note that the same decision could simultaneously be the product
of interest, principle, or passion. David Hume, for instance, notes that
the laity and the clergy were motivated by principle and interest respectively in maintaining the prerogatives of the priesthood.' 4 Likewise, Don Herzog notes how a member of the Ku Klux Klan might
have a self-interest in preventing economic competition from Black
labor, a passionate attachment to parading around in funny white
robes, and a principled attachment to the theory of racism.' 5 It is also
never self-evident whether a motive proceeds ultimately from one or
another motive, because one's self-interest might turn out to be a consequence of principle or passion. 16 Consider, for instance, the farmer
who supports farm subsidies-but who remains a farmer eligible for
such subsidies rather than selling his land to a developer for a tidy
profit only because he adheres to a back-to-the-earth ideology or has a
passionate commitment to maintaining a family farm. Note also that
the tripartite division does not purport to be exhaustive. Even David
Hume's essay on parties, the canonical citation for the tripartite division of motives, classifies only "real" parties into those rooted in principle, passion, or interest: In addition to these, there are purely
"personal" factions rooted in differences the only purpose of which is
7
to serve as markers for conflict.1
The critical point, for the purposes of this essay, is that none of
these motives can be regarded as inherently "impartial." Each might
14. See David Hume, Of Parties in General, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY
54, 61-62 (Eugene Miller ed., 1985).
15. See DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 147 (1998).
16. SeeJohn W. Kingdon, Politicians,Self-Interest, and Ideas, inRECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 83-86 (George Marcus & Russell Hanson eds., 1993).

17. See Hume, supra note 14, at 57-58. Hume cites the strife between proponents of
two different teams of charioteers, the "Blue" and "Green" teams, in the Byzantine Empire,
as such a division. Interestingly, he regarded racial strife as a product of such "personal"
division. See id. at 59.
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compromise objectivity by distorting decision-making away from the
socially appropriate end. The SS officer who stays at his post in a concentration camp out of a sense of disinterested loyalty to the cause of
antisemitism even though the work is emotionally traumatic for him is
a principled actor-and none the less "partial" for his ideological motivation.1 8 Likewise, passionless decision-making is not thereby rendered objective, if passion is necessary or helpful to focus the decision
on the appropriate criteria.' 9 Consider, for instance, Burke's attack on
the "French System," which charges the Jacobins with inappropriately
fanatical reliance on ideology to the neglect of passion.
Thus, detecting a conflict of interest is not simply a matter of
determining whether or not a decisionmaker will materially benefit
from a decision. To the contrary, in certain contexts, precisely such a
personal incentive might be essential to insure that the decisionmaker
can be trusted.2 0 Reliance on principle (or ideology), likewise, does
not guarantee disinterestedness, if the principle is the wrong principle
or if it is pursued with the wrong intensity. (Would a member of
Greenpeace make a disinterested decision on whaling simply because
he lacked any financial stake in the outcome?) As Andrew Stark has
argued, whether a conflict of interest results from ideology is a tricky
matter of interpreting a social practice: Ideology may or may not com2
promise objectivity, depending on the context and actor. '
C. Judges and Voters Compared
With this complexity in mind, has Eisgruber made a persuasive
case that judges are more impartial than voters or their elected representatives? I think not. Considering interest, passion, and principle in
turn, voters are at least as impartial as federal judges.

18. Heinrich Himmler famously praised such officers' sense of duty when touring the
camps.
19. See Elizabeth Theiss-Morse et al., Passion and Reason in PoliticalLife: The Organization of Affect and Cognition and Political Tolerance, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC

249-50 (stating that "citizenship requires combined reliance on passion and reason");
HERZOG, supra note 15, at 150 (stating that "appeals to the sympathies and compassion of
one's audience" fuel the pursuit ofjustice).
20. Thus, members of many corporations' board of directors are expected to buy
stock in the company on the board of which they sit. Consider, also, the familiar argument
that public school teachers ought to be eligible for merit pay in order to give them the
right incentive to pursue their students' best interest aggressively.
21. SeeANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 119-24 (2000).
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Material Self-Interest: The Sociotropic Voter and the PowerHungry Judge

Concerning interest, one can agree with Eisgruber that decisions
about moral principles should be rooted in reasons different than decisions about how best to maximize the wealth or welfare of the community or individual. Eisgruber, however, has made no persuasive case
that voters are more likely than judges to be motivated by material
self-interest. As noted above, each voter has such a small likelihood of
affecting the outcome of an election that it would be irrational for any
to use their vote for personal gain. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the great weight of the research shows that voters do not vote on the
basis of personal self-interest. Instead, they seem to engage in "sociotropic" voting-voting on the basis of their assessment of the public
good. 2 2 Of course, some interest groups focus on the narrow self-interest of their members despite collective action problems that make
such a focus difficult. But, as Mark Tushnet points out in his contribution to this symposium, constitutional doctrine rarely deals with matters of interest to these groups. 23 On those issues implicated by
constitutional doctrine-gay and lesbian rights, sex equality, abortion,
gun control, racial equality, criminal procedure, capital punishment,
free speech, etc.-the relevant groups (NARAL, ACLU, the Christian
Coalition, the NRA, the NAACP, etc.) 24 and voters seem focused on
sociotropic ideologies of one sort or another, not on padding their
pocketbooks.
What about judges? As Eisgruber notes, judges lack any financial
stake in the outcome of their decisions. 25 However, unlike voters,
judges have a direct and personal stake in the system of government
that they help shape: they are, after all, government officials whose
power will grow or shrink based on their own decisions enlarging or
contracting judicial review. Moreover, unlike an individual voter, an
individual judge or small number ofjudges can affect policy outcomes
22. See Donald Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Sociotropic Politics, 11 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
129 (1981). Thus,,even low-income voters who would benefit from such redistribution reject redistribution of wealth that is inconsistent with their conception of the proper scope
of economic inequality. See also JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS
ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1981).

23. See Mark Tushnet, A Goldilocks Account of Judicial Review?, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 63
(2002).
24. The National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL); American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); National Rifle Association (NRA); National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
25.
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in ways that increase or decrease their own power. Of course, such
decisions will not affect the Article III judges' income. But monetary
wealth is hardly the only measure of material self-interest: power and
social prestige which rests on power are equally important, especially
for ambitious lawyers who often take a pay cut in order to exercise
Article III prerogatives.
It is plausible to believe that the prestige of federal judges rests in
no small part on the perception that they exercise broad powers of
judicial review and can "strike down" state and even federal laws that
violate some vaguely defined standard of justice. Judges who spend
their days parsing obscure clauses of the bankruptcy code or resolving
tedious discovery disputes will likely lack the charisma, social standing,
and fame of a judge who makes front page news by striking down
legislation. Should it be at all surprising that federal judges might find
the exercise of powers proffered by Eisgruber personally attractive?
Freed from financial pressure by Article III, section 1, will the judge
be all the more able to pursue other personal goals -say, winning the
approval of his social or ideological group through decisions that win
favorable notice in journals and newspapers read by his or her
friends? No voter has the power to win such fame and approval
through his or her vote, even if he or she could credibly identify what
that vote was, despite the secret ballot.
Thus, one could plausibly argue that federal judges are more selfinterested in their decisions than voters. The question, of course, is an
empirical one. Sadly, there is far less empirical research on the motivations of federal judges than there is on the motivations of voters. As
Fred Schauer has noted, this may be because so many scholars share
Eisgruber's assumption that the insulation provided by Article III suffices to make federal judges disinterested. 26 However, comparing the
well-documented sociotropic motives of voters with plausible assumptions about judges, the truth of the matter seems exactly the opposite
of Eisgruber's account: Voters are less likely to be driven by material
self-interest than judges.
Why is Eisgruber so convinced that judges are disinterested despite judges' obvious self-interest in their own power? Consider the
analogy between Eisgruber's case for judges' power and the old Tory
case for a powerful landed gentry. The landed gentry seems impartial
just so long as one excludes from consideration their own self-interest
26. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the IngloriousDeterminants ofJudicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 616-18 (2000).
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in controlling land: Take the basis for their social prestige and power
off the agenda of ordinary politics, and they indeed have nothing to
gain or lose from ordinary politics. Likewise, judges will seem disinterested just so long as one ignores their self-interest in broad judicial
review. But this approach begs the question that needs to be decided:
should the issue of judicial review be taken off the agenda of elected
politicians?
2.

Principle: Can Judges Be Trusted to Speak for the People's
Values?

Lack of material self-interest in the outcome of a decision is not,
however, the only relevant measure of impartiality. There also is the
question of whether the presence of inappropriate principles is more
likely to distort voters' or judges' decisions. As Eisgruber notes, the
relevant principle that ought to guide constitutional decision makers
are the deeply held moral values of the People. One can concede for
the sake of argument that the People do not consist only of a majority
of the voters or even the majority of the entire population: The People's values might rather be those values necessary to define the citizenry as a "moral community," in Ronald Dworkin's sense of the
term. 27 However, Eisgruber is insistent that the moral values enforced
by judges must be the values of the People, not the values of the
judges themselves: "Constructing the American people's conception
ofjustice is not the same thing as expressing one's own conception of
justice or as expressing the best conception of justice, whatever that
might mean." 28 Therefore, judges or voters would be acting improperly if they followed principles because they or their friends or their
social class adhered to those values rather than because those values
were genuinely shared throughout the nation.
The question, therefore, is whether the voters or the judges are
most likely to adhere to popular values. Conventional wisdom would
suggest an obvious answer: The People know their own values as well
as or better than the lawyers who staff Article III courts. The reason is
not difficult to discern: It is a familiar point since Tocqueville published Democracy in America2 9 that lawyers as a class tend to have values
and beliefs that differ significantly from those of the public generally.
As Tocqueville noted, lawyers as a class attain their affluence through
27.
28.
29.
Francis

DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 23-26.
EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 126.
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their educational attainments, which gives them a "notion of their superiority" over lay people, "repugnance for the actions of the multitude," and "secret contempt of government of the people." 30 These
characteristics led Tocqueville to regard lawyers as the closest thing to
an aristocracy that America has-a social class that continually places
a brake on democratic opinion under the guise of helping to execute
popular wishes. If the point of constitutional decision-making is to enforce widespread popular values, lawyers would hardly be the natural
class from which to draw constitutional decision-makers.
Eisgruber is aware of the possibility that "drawing every member
of an important political institution from a single profession would
produce an undemocratic bias."31 His six pages of discussion, however, are an inadequate response to this worry. Eisgruber notes only
that judges are confirmed by the United States Senate and, therefore
are likely to have values that roughly track popular consensus.3 2 This
is true as far as it goes, but it simply ignores the sociological basis for
believing that lawyers, as a class, subtly support elitist over popular
values in the way that Tocqueville and other sociologists have described. 33 Even if one concedes that judges' views will likely track the
views of the public in some rough sense, why would one choose judges
over elected politicians whose views are much more likely to have a
populist tone?
Eisgruber's answer to this question is that judges, for all their undemocratic tendencies, are more likely to make principled decisions
because they give published justifications for their decisions and their
power is so great that they must take personal responsibility for their
votes. 34 Voters, by contrast, might cast their ballot in a frivolous or
thoughtless way in the secrecy of the voting booth. 35 Publicity and responsibility, in short, helps insure that judges will make serious30. Id. at

283-84.
supra note 1, at 67.
32. See id. at 68, 71.
33. See Michael Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 145, 189 (1998) (noting that 'Justices of the United States Supreme Court, indeed of
any state or federal appellate court, are overwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and
extremely well educated, usually at the nation's more elite universities" and share a "a
culturally elite bias" which "has roughly correlated with a politically liberal one").
34. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 71.
35. Eisgruber takes issue with this characterization of his argument, but his own "Reply to Five Critics" confirms my interpretation. He argues that voters lack incentives "to
engage in extensive reflection and research." Christopher Eisgruber, ConstitutionalSelf-Government andJudicialReview: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 115, 138 (2002). This is a
polite way of saying that voters are careless-precisely my interpretation of Eisgruber's
views.
31.

EISGRUBER,
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minded decisions about principle. It is important to see that this argument is distinct from the theory that voters are more self-interested
than judges. As I noted above, that self-interest theory simply contradicts the available evidence. By contrast, Eisgruber's argument based
on public reason-giving does reflect the undisputed facts that judges
publish opinions, while voters cast secret ballots. But is this factual
distinction sufficient grounds for arguing that judges are likely to act
in a more appropriatelyprincipled way than voters? Like his argument
about the self-interestedness of voters, his argument about the benefits of publicity and small numbers rests too much on a priori reasoning, ignoring the relevant empirical literature. There is considerable
evidence that secrecy and collective responsibility by large numbers of
people can produce principled decision-making.
Take, first, the question of whether secrecy or publicity most effectively produces principled decision-making. There is a familiar argument, ignored by Eisgruber, that secrecy protects principle by
preventing public pressure from causing individuals to conceal their
sincere beliefs in favor of ones popular with onlookers. 36 The law follows this conventional account frequently enough. The United States
Supreme Court refuses to permit oral arguments to be televised and
bars all disclosure of what was said by justices in conference. Jury deliberations are typically secret. The secret ballot is rooted in similar
fears of improper pressure: Progressive reformers convinced the nation in the late nineteenth century that the partisan ballot (i.e., ballots
printed by the parties and easily identifiable as a particular party's ballot by their color or shape) subjected voters to undue influence to
political parties. The Australian ballot that they introduced lessened
this source of pressure. Such a system of secrecy had its costs: it weakened parties, lowered voter turnout, and perhaps helped to disenfranchise illiterate voters. 37 Nevertheless, the Australian ballot is
rooted in precisely the same reasons that cause courts to observe principles of confidentiality in their deliberations-the principle that public scrutiny of some aspects of decision making would deter rather
than inspire principled decision making. Eisgruber assumes that secret ballots are unprincipled ballots, but one might just as soundly
assert that federal judges vote dishonestly because they do not observe
36. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 91-97 (1995) (outlining case for secret ballots).

37.

OF
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government in the sunshine by making the public privy to their internal deliberations, bench memos, etc. 38 (Was Judge Harold Baer's fa-

mous switch in time on the exclusion of evidence improved by the
public scrutiny to which his decision was subjected?)
Consider also Eisgruber's assumption that individual judges'
enormous power to alter policy outcomes will insure that they take
their duty to follow popular principles seriously. Eisgruber suggests
that individual voters might not take the time to deliberate carefully
about their vote because they know that their vote will not affect the
outcome. But Eisgruber ignores literature suggesting that there is
safety rather than frivolity in numbers: Because so many votes are cast
in the typical election, the odds are that frivolous voters will be
swamped by the far larger numbers of principled voters.39 By contrast,
only the luck of the draw and the uncertain recourse of certiorari review prevents a renegade judge or panel from imposing anti-populist
or idiosyncratic values on a considerable part of the nation.
It also does not follow that voters pay no attention to relevant
information just because they cast secret ballots. As Benjamin Page
and Robert Shapiro have shown with substantial evidence, "political
information and interpretations are produced and disseminated
through a complex social system which involves organizations, division
of labor, and transmission through social networks. '40 This is a fancy
way of saying that voters hear public discussions of issues on the radio,
TV, town meetings, dinner tables, interest group sessions, etc., before
they vote, even if they need not reveal their own individual positions
after they vote. Finally, there is more to voter participation than voting:
The lay public participates in public decision making in ways that do
not involve secret ballots-by contacting representatives through letters and phone calls, showing up at mass demonstrations, canvassing
neighborhoods on behalf of candidates, speaking at public hearings,

38. How do we know, after all, that those published decisions are anything more than
phony post hoc rationalizations, a smokescreen to distract the public from the real horsetrading that occurred in conference? The Legal Realists, after all, offered something like
this hypothesis.
39. See BENJAMIN PACE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FiFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' PUBLIC PREFERENCES 20-23 (1992). Condorcet's famous 'jury theo-

rem" provides a similar argument that, as the number of voters increases, the likelihood
increases that their decision will be correct. See Marquis De Condorcet, Essay on the Applica-

tion ofMathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making,in CONDORCET:
Michael Baker ed., 1976).

40.

See PAGE &

SHAPIRO,

supra note 39, at 362-66.
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and participating on citizen juries and panels. 41 To measure the worth
of political decision-making by the secret ballot alone is just as silly as
to measure the value of judicial decision-making by the secret horsetrading that occurs in conference.
In sum, there is very little reason to believe that voters cast frivolous ballots simply because they cast secret ballots in large numbers.
By contrast, there is substantial reason to believe that Article IIIjudges
might reach decisions that are hostile to popular values. Both decision-makers may be principled decision-makers, but voters and their
elected representatives are more likely to follow the right-meaning
popular-principles.
3.

Passion: The Importance of Being Earnest

Eisgruber focuses entirely on the voters' alleged tendencies towards self-interest and lack of principle as the best grounds for preferring judges to elected politicians as expositors of the people's values.
Oddly, he ignores the traditional argument that voters might be excessively passionate in their attachments, ignoring their permanent values not because they are greedy are frivolous but because they are
impulsive and emotional. This third sense of being "partial," however,
might be the strongest basis for his faith in judges. There is little evidence that voters are more self-interested or less principled than
judges. But there are plausible grounds for believing that judges act
more slowly and less emotionally than popular decision-makers. This
tendency is a function not only of glacial legal procedures but also a
professional culture that values precedent and discourages innovation. Judges might protect deeply held popular values simply by slow42
ing the people down.

While this is the most empirically well-supported basis for judicial
review, it is also the most ambiguous. The reason is that it takes passion to deliberate about foundational moral issues. Precisely because
they are foundational, they are implicit and, therefore, difficult to articulate. They also tend to be rancorously divisive. It is natural to be
diffident about such matters and to avoid direct confrontation with
them, whether one is a judge or voter. Lack of self-interest will not
41. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 72 (1995) (describing fourteen types of lay participation in politics).
42. Note an ambiguity in this argument: Judges might slow the people down either by
enforcing long-standing traditional values or by enforcing elite legal values. Michael Klarman doubts whether judges are well-suited for the former function. See Klarman, supra
note 33, at 164 (arguing instead that judges simply enforce the biases of the legal elite).
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insure that one confronts matters so thorny: One needs some positive
incentive to do so. Politicians and activists who have some passionate
commitment to changing social norms are far more likely to have
such an incentive than judges. But such persons are unlikely to be
attracted to the bench precisely because judges have so few opportunities to engage in passionate activity. For this reason, most passionate
constitutional controversies have been inspired and led not by judges
but by politicians and journalists like Thomas Jefferson (concerning
free speech and the Alien and Sedition Acts), AndrewJackson (on the
legitimacy of public improvements), Daniel Webster (on the legitimacy of state nullification), Frederick Douglas (on the legitimacy of
slavery), Elizabeth Cady Stanton (on female equality), Eugene Debs
(on the constitutionality of strikes), and Martin Luther King (on racial
equality).
Eisgruber asserts that many great moral controversies of high
quality and passion have involved public discussion of judicial decisions. 43 However, Eisgruber may be confusing constitutional decisionmaking with judicial decision-making. Constitutional decisions are
often the inspiration of great moral debates, but judicial decisions
rarely are. This is an error made as well by Ronald Dworkin, whose
influence is so evident in Eisgruber's book. Ronald Dworkin has observed that "[w] hen an issue is seen as constitutional ... and as one
that will ultimately be resolved by the courts applying general constitutional
principles, the quality of public argument is improved, because the argument concentrates from the start on questions of political morality." 4 4 This is half right: the constitutionalization of an issue signals
that the issue involves a matter of high moral principle. But neither
Eisgruber nor Dworkin provide much evidence for the italicized suggestion that such constitutionalization requires judicial leadership. To
the contrary, constitutional issues may be best pursued in non-judicial
forums, precisely because such "legal" disputes do not involve ordinary legal controversies but rather passionate fights that mix rhetoric
about custom and history with raw emotion and big principles. 45 The
great antebellum constitutional struggles-the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the postal service's refusal to circulate abolitionist literature in
the South during the 1830s, John Quincy Adams' fight in Congress
against the "gag rule," Jackson's Maysville Road Veto Message, South
43. See EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 96-97 (citing Dred Scott as an example).
44. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 345 (emphasis added).
45. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We The Court, 115
L. REv. 4 (2001).
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Carolina's threat to nullify the 1832 "tariff of abominations," Bleeding
Kansas, etc.-owed nothing to any judicial involvement. Dred Scott
came at the end, not the beginning of the slavery debate, and it hardly
elevated the substance of the debate beyond, say, the Senate's debates
over the 1850 compromise.
Indeed, the legalisms to which the judiciary is prone arguably degrades rather than elevates constitutional politics. Judicial rhetoric has
a tinny, legalistic quality. Big moral questions of life, liberty, equality,
are reduced to n-part tests, trimester frameworks, criteria for being a
"suspect classification," epicycles on epicycles of doctrine which then
infects the political process with its hair-splitting and Alexandrian convolutions. Eisgruber's book, like Dworkin's Freedom's Law, can be read
as an effort to cure judicial rhetoric of this tendency toward technicality, so that judges might more directly confront moral questions free
from the shackles of legal technique. But neither Eisgruber nor Dworkin consider the possibility that such rhetoric is the occupational habit
of being a judge, part of the elitist professional culture that judges
consciously and unconsciously adopt to solidify their priestly claims to
authority. It is a striking characteristic of Eisgruber's book that, despite his praise for judicial decision-making in abstract, he rarely discusses in any detail the language or reasoning of any actual judicial
decisions. Perhaps none meet his ideal standards for uplifting moral
rhetoric. But then the possibility arises that this absence of inspiring
examples is no accident that can be cured by mere academic exhortation. Judges may turn out to be inveterately passionless quibblers who
suppress dissent from their rulings by falling back on the rhetoric of
professional expertise. When they attempt riffs of high-flown rhetoric,
the result is usually a pale imitation of what great constitutional politicians (Jefferson, Lincoln, Webster, King, etc) produce: In Kurt Vonnegut's phrase, judicial moralizing sounds like the 1812 Overture
played on kazoos.
In sum, judges' interest, principles, and passions do not seem to
make them the ideal expositors of popular ideals. They are at least as
self-interested as voters; they are unlikely to be devoted to popular
principles; and they lack the passion necessary persuasively to resolve
public moral controversies. Could the People or their elected representatives really do any worse?
II.

What Is "Popular Self-Government"?

Assume for the moment that the answer to that question ending
the preceding paragraph is "yes": Popular politics over constitutional
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issues is less principled and more self-interested than judicial politics.
Assume also that the confirmation process before the United States
Senate insures that judges' beliefs and values, in a general way, track
popular beliefs and values. Would it follow that judicial review necessarily protects Americans' power of self-government over matters of
principle?
On one view of democracy, no. Judicial representation of the
people cannot be democratic self-government because the people are
not the effective cause of judicial decisions' alleged consistency with
popular values. On this view of democracy, true democratic self-government means that the people get what they demand because they demand it: Popular participation must be the cause of governmental
responsiveness to popular values. One might roughly identify this view
with what Quentin Skinner has called the "neo-Roman" theory of liberty. According to Skinner, the neo-Roman theory flourished in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, expressed especially in the writings of Commonwealth theorists like John Milton and James Harrington. 46 The essential premise of neo-Roman theories was that no
person could be free unless they lived in a "free state." A free state, in
turn, was a state controlled by the governed. Thus, even if a king acted
as a benevolent despot whose decisions faithfully reflected popular
values, the king would not guarantee freedom of the people, because
47
the people would still be subject to power that they did not control.
Such people were "obnoxii," dependents who lacked the dignity of free
citizens and whose character would be degraded by being subject to
arbitrary power (meaning power uncontrolled by the people), even if
4
such power was never actually exercised.

Judicial power can never be popular self-government in this
sense. Even if judges' decisions reflect popular moral values, they do
not do so as a result of popular participation. The People themselves
do not causejudges to reflect popular values because there is no mechanism for the people to force the Court to listen and respond to popular views. They can send letters to the Court denouncing or
applauding the Court's decisions, but the Court's culture (not to mention its rules of procedure) forbids its members from taking such communications seriously. They can wait with picket signs on the marble
steps of the United States Supreme Court Building for the proverbial
puff of smoke announcing the decision-but it is the pride of the
46.
47.
48.

See QUENTIN SKINNER,
See id. at 68-70.
See id. at 36-44.

LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM

11-16 (1998).
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Court that such popular displays can have no influence on the what
the college of legal cardinals decides. At most, popular pressure can
influence which judges are confirmed. Both Dworkin and Eisgruber
celebrate these brief moments of popular participation, but it is hard
to take this sort of attenuated participation seriously as anything like a
robust democratic process: only a handful of the most determined interest groups and high-profile academics can have anything to say at
such hearings. Moreover, even these political elites cannot say anything very substantial about any nominee without a substantial paper
trail. Presidents have an incentive to nominate persons like David Souter or Anthony Kennedy who have no paper trail to discuss. Thus, the
confirmation process has become an intellectually barren game of catand-mouse, where the nominee blandly refuses to say anything that
could spark the sort of popular discussion that Eisgruber celebrates,
and the hostile senators try to trap the nominee into saying something
substantial and therefore controversial.
Eisgruber has two responses to this attack on judicial power as
unaccountable power. First, he simply derides the democratic accountability provided by popular elections. Second, he launches a
frontal assault on the idea that popular participation must be linked
to governmental outputs-that the people must actually control or
determine the governmental expression of values in their name. Both
of these arguments fail, the first for lack of evidence and the second
for lack of theoretical plausibility. More fundamentally, both arguments reflect an unconscious, anti-democratic bias that is, perhaps,
endemic in the legal academy.
Take, first, Eisgruber's charge that ordinary voters will not participate in democratic processes because their own vote will rarely effect
the outcome of the election. He makes the familiar charge that "largescale elections can render individual political action meaningless. ''49
According to Eisgruber, there is no "good reason to suppose that elections will provide opportunities or incentives for vigorous citizen activity in political communities with more than a few hundred thousand
citizens. ' 50 Eisgruber does not support these claims with any serious
research, and it turns out that they deserve more skepticism than he
gives them. There is an enormous literature on the issue of voters'
"rational ignorance," not much of which is discussed or even cited by

49.

EISGRUBER, supra note

50.

Id. at 80.

1, at 88.
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Eisgruber. 5 1 The upshot of this literature, however, is that the theory
is not predictive of voter behavior: voters do vote, in large numbers,
despite the economic prediction that they will stay home. One might
infer, therefore, that ordinary people, as opposed to academics, do
feel that elections allow them to participate in a meaningful way in
self-government. Moreover, they seem to vote intelligently, using interest group endorsements, political parties, and other signals as proxies for information that they personally lack. 52 Although Eisgruber
scoffs at the idea that individual voters can make a difference "in polit53
ical communities with more than a few hundred thousand citizens,"
he forgets that those large communities are divided into much smaller
electoral districts which are the relevant unit for most sorts of political
activity. 54 Although the average state has around two million residents,

the average state legislative electoral district contains only fifty thousand voters. 55 It should not be surprising that the cost of campaigning
in state districts is not overwhelmingly high: even in large states like
New York, incumbents spent an average of only $35,000.56 At this
price, even a person of moderate means and good reputation with the
community can afford to run for office, let alone vote for it-and
many do. Aside from state legislative elections, there are literally hundreds of thousands of local elective or volunteer offices with correspondingly small electoral districts: roughly three percent of the
57
population serves in such an office.

There is, of course, a long-standing debate in political science between those who discount popular control of government through
51. For a summary of the literature, see Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of SelfInterest in the Exploration of PoliticalLife, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 1-22 (Jane J. Mansbridge
ed., 1990).
52. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA (1998);
SAMUEL POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGNS (1991).

53.
54.

supra note 1, at 80.
See Rosemary Zagarri, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1776-1850 (1987), (discussing the roots of the American tradition of reducing
electorate size with single-member districts).
55. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and
Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1220 (1999).
56. See Samuel C. Patterson, LegislativePolitics in the States, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 159, 168-69 (Virginia Gray & Herbert Jacob eds.,
1996) (state elections). Most candidates for state legislatures spend much less than candidates for the United States House of Representatives. Cf NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN et al., VITAL
STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1999-2000 82-83 (2000) (federal elections). California is the
only state where expenditures approach federal levels-not surprisingly, given the enormous size of California's state legislative districts.
57. See VERBA, supra note 41, at 51.
EISGRUBER,
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elections as a sham and those who regard such control as flawed but
effective. The most famous proponent of the first view is Walter Lippman; his modern intellectual heirs include Philip Converse, John Zaller, and other social scientists who regard popular opinion as fickle,
uninformed, and easily manipulable by elites. The more confident
view about democratic participation is most famously represented by
John Dewey's writings and the. research of some modern believers in
democratic effectiveness, such as Samuel Popkin and Benjamin Page.
Eisgruber uncritically adopts the first view of democratic processes
without considering the evidence that elections are far more effective
at conveying public values than he asserts. His skepticism about the
democratic importance of elections, therefore, must itself be treated
with skepticism; it provides little support for his argument.
Eisgruber's second argument is more powerful: It challenges the
need for the people to be the effective cause of government's expression of values. Eisgruber argues that government must impartially represent interests and must effectively choose policies desired by
citizens, 58 but neither of these requirements is connected to citizen
self-government. In theory, "wise and beneficent rulers" might provide such benefits without any citizen input. 59 Eisgruber, therefore,

throws in participation and deliberation as additional prerequisites
for regimes to qualify as "democratic.

' 60

But the participation in ques-

tion need bear only the most attenuated relationship to what government actually does: he specifies only that "any citizen willing to
commit time and effort should be able to make a meaningful difference in politics and feel that politics is a rewarding part of her own
life.

' 61

Participation, therefore, need not be the cause of governments'

effectively choosing one policy over another: In Eisgruber's scheme,
participation is more like therapy than a decision-making procedure.
Of course, Eisgruber does concede that the citizen's participation
must make a meaningful difference in politics, but he never specifies that
meaningful difference means influence proportionate to ability to
persuade her fellow citizens. Nor could he, because any such requirement would compromise the goal of impartiality. If participation was
the engine that controlled government's representation of interests
and values, then the civic activists' interests and values would crowd
out the values and desires of civic slobs who did not vote or read a
58.
59.
60.
61.

See EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
Id.at 85.
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newspaper. For lovers of democratic participation, this is not a problem: power should be proportionate to participation: Voters and
speakers get influence, and soap-opera watchers don't, and the latter's
lack of power is the penalty for abdicating their duty to be a good
citizen. For Eisgruber, however, participation cannot have such influence. Therefore, he assigns it to a therapeutic rather than political
position: Participation is like those toy steering wheels that parents
install in cars to give children the sensation of control without the
62
reality.
The essentially therapeutic nature of public inputs is even more
obvious from Eisgruber's discussion of "deliberation." Eisgruber stipulates that "[d] emocracies should encourage citizens to think and converse about basic questions of justice" but "[p]ublic discussion of this
kind can take place even if most citizens lack the power to influence
the outcome of the debate." 6 3 Of course, citizens cannot really influence the Court's decisions with their deliberation but Eisgruber insists
that this powerlessness does not distinguish the Court from Congress:
"Most Americans have little power to sway" Congress in Eisgruber's
view. 64 Therefore, their discussions of either federal congressional issues or cases before the Court are, in either case, mere discussions,
designed to promote their own education rather than change the decisions of their government.
In short, Eisgruber believes that public deliberation can be disconnected from public power. He analogizes arguments before the
United States Supreme Court as a spectator sport in which the audience gets involved in the discussion on the sidelines, "think[ing] it
through, and discussing the argument with other spectators. '65 For
the purposes of encouraging deliberation, debate sparked by controversial Supreme Court decisions is sufficient even though the debaters
have no power to change the outcome. Dworkin shares this assumption. Consider, for instance, the following passage:
62. In response to my argument, Eisgruber argues that citizens' "persuasive power" is
"exceedingly inegalitarian" because such power depends on characteristics like"her education, her looks, her talents, her wealth, her fame, or her family name ... not her level of
participation." Eisgruber, supra note 35, at 172. But all of these characteristics can generate
"persuasive power" only if other citizens are persuaded by them. Thus, there is nothing
"inegalitarian" about a Kennedy having more influence than a Hills with voters because of
her name: It is voters themselves who confer influence on the name, using it as a proxy for
other characteristics like ideology or character.
63. See EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 86.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 98.
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[T] here is no necessary connection between a citizen's political impact or influence and the ethical benefit he secures through participating in public discussion or deliberation. The quality of the
discussion might be better, and his own contribution more genuinely deliberative and public-spirited in a general public debate
preceding or following a judicial decision than in a political battle
66
culminating in a legislative vote or even a referendum.
Thus, Dworkin applauds the public discussion of decisions like
Roe v. Wade "in newspapers and other media, in law schools and class67
rooms, in public meetings and around dinner tables."
Eisgruber's and Dworkin's belief in the sufficiency of impotent
talk rests, I think, on two distinct errors. Both of these errors are
rooted in a deeper indifference to, or even disdain for, lay participation in politics and true political equality.
First, Eisgruber ignores the relationship between power and deliberation: He assumes that public discussion of public affairs can be
treated like a college seminar, divorced from practical effects on political outcomes. But Jon Elster has suggested why power and deliberation must be connected to each other. According to Elster, civic
deliberation is a state that is essentially a by-product of true decision
making: Unless there is some practical decision that will be determined by deliberation, people will not discuss a public issue with the
seriousness of purpose that is required to promote civic virtue. 68 Thus,
the jury system would not produce serious deliberation unless jurors
really believed that they decided issues of money, imprisonment, life,
or death. 6 9 Likewise, one cannot expect the public to discuss the details of Casey or Roe with any care or intelligence unless they believe
that they will have some share in deciding whether to sustain these
decisions. Indeed, there is little evidence that the lay public has any
awareness of the doctrinal debates on the United States Supreme
Court. Of course, the bar and law professors debate doctrine
fiercely-but these constituencies believe that they have some influence on the Court's decisions. The lay public knows better, and their
discussions of the Court's doctrinal debates is correspondingly muted.
supra note 2, at 30.
Id. at 34-35.
See JoN ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 91-100 (1982).
SeeJon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103, 120-27 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986)
(noting that "the satisfaction one derives from political discussion is parasitic on decision
making" such that political debate cannot produce beneficial side effects such as self-respect, civic energy, etc., unless these benefits are perceived by the actors as side effects of
the pursuit of political decisions).
66.
67.
68.
69.
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Second, Eisgruber ignores the elitist symbolism of judicial
processes and the egalitarian nature of electoral processes. As Robert
Wiebe has noted, elections in America have served a leveling function,
because their implicit message is that the governed are the social and
cultural equals of the governors.7 0 Every election is a saturnalia in
which the officials abase themselves before the voters, seeking their
support and acknowledging their legitimacy as final arbiters of moral
and policy questions. Whether or not voters have the influence that
politicians attribute to them, Wiebe argues persuasively that the ritual
of elections instills voters with a sense of civic competence and authority necessary to sustain a democratic sensibility. By.contrast, every aspect of judicial ritual, procedure, and rhetoric is designed to suppress
any sense that the laity are the social or intellectual equals of the officials ruling in their name. The robes; the curtains from behind which
the justices emerge before argument; the "oyez! oyez!" of the clerk;
the special seats reserved for the members of the bar; the omnipotence of the judge in setting the agenda and terms of debate; the reliance on precedent and technical language that no layperson can
hope to master; the status of those who appear as "petitioners" rather
than as voters; the curt power to cut off debate or back talk with
threats of contempt-all are in stark contrast to any election or even
congressional hearing. By placing moral issues in such a forum, Eisgruber insures that they will be monopolized by a narrow social elitelawyers and law professors from a tiny number of law schools and the
journalists who hang out with them.
In sum, Eisgruber's separation of public deliberation from public
power fatally undermines the quality and equality of the former. I believe that this willingness to sever power and participation rests ultimately on a deeper, albeit implicit, anti-democratic assumption-the
assumption that there cannot be a connection between quality of argument and numbers of persons who are persuaded by an argument.
This assumption underlies both Eisgruber's and Ronald Dworkin's derisive characterization of electoral politics as just a matter of "counting
heads" 7 1 or "the weight of numbers. '7 2 Judicial decisions, by contrast,
rest on the "quality of reasons"'7 3 or "fundamental principle. '74 This
contrast between the weight of numbers and the quality of reasons,
70.

See ROBERT H.

WIEBE, SELF RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

69-85 (1995).

71.
72.
73.
74.

EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 98.
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 344.
EISGRUBER,

supra note 1, at 98.
2, at 344.
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however, is confused: the assumption of any regime of political equality is that the arguments that persuade the largest number of adherents are the best arguments. Where political equality reigns, the
weight of numbers is regarded as the best available proxy for the quality of argument. Thus, on that ultimate forum of principle, the United
States Supreme Court, five votes decides a case and sets precedent.
Why? Because the Justices are political equals: we assess the quality of
argument by counting noses. Likewise, in every philosophy department, hiring decisions which rest largely on the "quality of reasons" in
the published work of a candidate are determined by a majority or
super-majority vote of the faculty (or their elected representatives on
an executive committee). Why? Again, because the community is a
community of equals, "counting heads" is regarded as the only acceptable way to determine quality of argument.
Why do Dworkin and Eisgruber overlook this connection between the quality of an argument and the public support that the argument enjoys? I think that this strange disconnect can be explained
only by their assumption that voters are not the political equals of the
sorts of people who make and decide arguments in the United States
Supreme Court-lawyers and legal academics and judges and justices.
Their implicit assumption is that voters make their decisions based on
self-interest even in constitutional contexts where principle ought to
reign. As noted above in Part I, there is not a shred of evidence to
support this assumption: Voters are perfectly capable of distinguishing
the politics of pork from the politics of constitutional principle, and
they debate the latter in a sociotropic-that is, principled-way.
Whether debating physician-assisted suicide in Oregon or monitoring
the Senate to insure that President Clinton was impeached only for
high crimes and misdemeanors, the evidence suggests that the voters
put self-interest aside and vote conscientiously as principled decision
makers when an issue is marked as one of constitutional significance.
Eisgruber's contrary assumption is an expression of profound elitism.
Is such elitism justified? One of the more frustrating aspects of
Eisgruber's book is his repeated invocation of the need for unelected
bureaucrats to deliberate about "moral analysis" or "moral principles"
without any serious exposition of what such moral analysis might involve. He frequently calls upon judges to use the people's convictions
about justice to resolve disputes, as if these convictions could be easily
obtained through a little quiet reflection-derived, perhaps, from
some deductive methodology (Rawls'? Nozick's? Eisgruber's?). But
Eisgruber gives very few specific examples of the sorts of moral reason-
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ing that he has in mind. He offers an argument that constitutional
protection of sexual conduct is (or should be) rooted in a prohibition
against the public enforcement of certain sorts of hostile external
preferences. 75 Eisgruber does not, however, offer any philosophically
compelling argument that such preferences should be generally proscribed. If the Court adopted such a view, the majority could cite J.S.
Mill's On Liberty while the dissenters could cite James Fitzjames Stephens, and it would be impossible to determine from Eisgruber's argument which side ought to win. Eisgruber's confidence in the moral
reasoning ofjudges is not, in short, matched by any examples of such
reasoning that would inspire such confidence.
Given the contested nature of moral convictions, it is not surprising that Eisgruber occasionally falls back on the methodology that he
elsewhere attacks as insufficiently "principled": he counts heads. In
defending the idea that parental authority over children deserves
some constitutional protection, for instance, he observes that "most of
us will endorse some principles that guarantee us the freedom to be
parents."7 6 However, if what "most of us" believes is the basis for constitutional morality, then why not just rely on the elected branches to
resolve such issues? Presumably, they know as much about what the
majority ("most of us") believe as nine elderly lawyers that received
the President's nomination and the Senate's approval.
In short, there is no particular reason to believe that the Court
will be adept at making arguments about morality that will be persuasive either to professional philosophers or to the people. The Court
itself knows this and, therefore, has not assumed the moral creativity
that Eisgruber would assign to it. Instead, the Court more modestly
uses history, custom, widespread legislative practice, and other indicia
of popular consensus to infer what most of us believe and thereby fill
the gaps in the constitutional text. Eisgruber finds such reliance on
history and custom "mystical" 77 because "[t]raditions may reflect
moral errors" or "unjust power relationships. ' 78 But surely the same
could be said for creative judicial inferences about moral principles.
At least inferences about tradition and custom are a direct effort to get
at what "most of us" have believed most of the time. And at least the
people have some agency in creating the history, customs, and legislative practices upon which the Court relies.
75.
76.

EISGRUBER,

77.

Id. at 142.

78.

Id. at 144.

Id. at 150.

supra note 1, at 157-61.
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Conclusion
Eisgruber's argument for creative judicial review rests on two
ideas: first, We the People would want the most principled branch to
make moral decisions for us and, second, the United States Supreme
Court is the most principled branch. Both of these ideas are mistaken.
There is very little evidence that the Court's interests, passions, and
principles make them more likely to adhere to popular values than
the people's own elected representatives. Even if there were evidence
for such a position, the very idea of popular agency-self-government-requires that popular participation be the effective cause of
government's expression of popular values. Popular inputs lack such
influence on the Court.
This criticism leaves open the question of what exactly the
Court's role ought to be in interpreting the vaguer parts of the United
States Constitution. I will not attempt to answer that question here.
My more modest goal is that Eisgruber's answer-to make the Court
into the conscience of the nation-will not do. Popular convictions
about justice cannot be so easily inferred by judges, for those convictions hardly exist absent concrete disputes that are subject to popular
decision making. 79 They must be created by the people themselves.
Eisgruber seems to argue that the business of inferring popular moral
principles can be delegated to a corps of experts who will be insulated
from popular pressure while the people gather obediently around
them to provide color commentary on the experts' various "principled" arguments. But why should the people listen to those who refuse to listen to them?

79. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 22 (citing case studies in the conflict and hesitancy expressed by various interviewees concerning distributive justice).
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